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HE relationship between the Federal Reserve’s
discount rate and money market interest rates con-
tinues to be a topic of nuch interest and even more
confusion. A significant number’ of money mar-ket ana-
lysts and some in public service believe that the dis-
count rate is an iniportant tool through which the
Federal Reserve exerts its influence over- the economy
— particularly market interest rates. This view ap—
pear-s to have gathered strength fi-om recent evidence
that disrount rate changes have a statistically signifi-
cant effect on market inter’est rates and from the
presumed effects of a 1982 change in the Feder-al
Reserve’s operating procedure.’ Consequently, the
long—standing discrepancy between what economic
theory says about the relationship between the dis-
count rate and market interest r’ates and the view
among many money market analysts appears to have
become larger-. The purpose of this article is to narrow
the gap by pointing out that, both in theory and in
practice, changes in the Federal Reserve’s discount
rate, per se, have essentially n~effect on market inter-
est rates. At best they “signal” changes in the Feder-al
Reserve’s use of other- more powerful tools of policy.
Any impact of a discount rate change on market inter’—
est rates is due to changing expectations or’ to a
change in Federal Reserve operations following the
discount i-ate change.
Daniel L. Thornton is asenioreconomist at the FederalReserve Bankof
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‘See Thornton (1982) for a summary of some of the usualsources of
confusion; Thornton (1982), Setlon and Seibemt (1982) and Sniirloclc
and Yawitz (1985) for empirical estimates of a change in the dis-
count rate on market interest rates; and Batten and Thornton (1984,
1985) and Hakkio and Pearce (1986) tom empirical estimates of an
impact of a discountrate change on the foreign exchange market.
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Figure 1 illustrates a commonly held view of the
relationship tjetween a cut in the discount i-ate and
the response of market interest rates; it shows the
hypothetical time path ofmarket interest r’ates before
and after- a hypothetical cut in the Federal Reserve
discount rate at time t,,, and it reflects the perception
that a cut in the discount rate causes market interest
rates to be permanently lower than they othenvise
would have been.This cause-and-effect relationship is
purely qualitative. It is not clear whet her a 1
per-centage-point cut in the discount i-ate will lower’
market rates by 1 percentage point or only a few basis
points. It mer-elv is asserted that market i-ares will be
lower.
Theview that the discount rate is preeminent in the
money market contrasts sharply with economic the—
~y and the perception of many economists that the
discount rate is the least powerful of the F’eder’al
Reserves tools for influencing the money stock and
interest rates. Before turning to this analysis in detail,
it is instructive to consider sonic casual evidence
against the idea that the discount rate is preeminent
in the money market. Chart I shows the three—month
‘i’r’easurybill, federal funds and discount r’ates weekly
for’ the period from october 1982 to June 1986. What
do these data show about the effect of a discount rate
change on market interest rates? First, in a riumber of
instances, discount i-ate changes are followed closely
by a leveling ofi of mar-ket interest rates or’ by a move—
went in the opposite direction. While this does not
rule out the possibility that rirarket r’ates would have
been higher (lower’( if the discou nit rate had not been
cut (raised I, it does suggest that the market analyst
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view is not supported by a simple analysis of interest
rate behavior,
Second, near’ly all discount rate changes follow,
n’ather than lead, movements in market interest rates
in thesame (hirection).z It would seenir that changes in
market interest r-ates motivate discount rate changes
rather’than the reven-se. Furthermore, even when man’—
ket rates declined (increaseth following a discount
rate cut increase), it is particularly difficult to deter-—
mine whether man-ket i-ales would have moved in the
same or’similar’ fashion in the absence of a change in
the discount i-ate. While all of this is inconclusive, it
pr’ovides weak and often contrany evidence of a dis—
count n-ate/market interest rate Iitie of causation, and
provides little comfort to those who believe the view
illustrated by figur’e 1.
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Because the interest r’ate is the pr-ice of credit, any
impact of discount n’ate changes (in) man-ket interest
rates must come viatheir’ effect on the supply of or the
demand for credit. to this regard, three distinct —
though riot necessar-ilv mutually exclusive — effects of
a discount rate change can be identified. Thes ear’e
illustrated in figure 2. Prior to the discount r’ate cut,
the credit market is n equilibrium at an interest rate of
R,,, cor’r’esponding to the intersection of the initial
supply arid deman(I curves, 5,, arid D0, r’espect ivehy.
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‘i’he first effect, called the direct or substitution)
effect, causes a shift in the supply of credit. I)iscount
window borrowing is nine method depositonv institu—
ions use to adjust them’ reserve position. Alterna lively,
the~’ can buy federal funds or sell govei’nme nfl securi-
ties directly in) the money market? Since these alter’na—
byes an’e close substit tnt es, the demand for bor’r’owed
reserves depends oni the spread between market inter’—
est rates, especialiv the federal funds nate, arid the
discount rate. As the federal funds—discount rate
spn’ead in creases. bon’rowings Ireni the Fede ‘al Re—
serve tenid to incl’ease and vice versa. ‘l’hus, the level of
discount window borrowings usmrally is expressed as:
Ill lint-i’ = cr(H, — H,).
‘Thisis true of otherperiods as well; see Thornton (1982). p. 14.
‘Depository institutions also can call in loans or carry the deficiency
over into the next reserve period. They rarely, if ever, use these
alternatives, however.
where Born’ denotes the aggn’egate level of indebted—
ness of depositon’ institintions to the Federal Reserve
and R, and R, denote the feder’al funds and discount
n’ate, n’espectivelv.
To illustr’ate the din-ect effect of a change in the
discounit rateon man’ket interest r’ates, assunie that the
discount rate is cut. In response, depository institu—
tioris increase their bon-r-owings and reduce their use
of alternative sources of reserves. The in)cr’ease in
bon’rowings prodtrces an) micrease in the monetan’
base arul, iti turn. Ihe supply ofcredit — illustr’ated in
figur-e 2 by ashift from 5,, to 5,. Thus, adiscount r’ate cut
has a direct effect, causing market interest r’ates to
decline from H0 to H,. ‘the effect of an increase in the
discount i-ate would be symmetric.
Additionally, discount rate changes can have an
‘‘announcement effect.’’ If a change in) the discount
n’ate is inter-pn’eted as a ‘‘signal’’ that tI ie Fedcn’aI Re-
serve will alter’ its policy with respect to the gn’owth of
reserves and Ihe money stock, Ihe market may react in
anticipation of a policy change. A cut in the discournt
i-ate usu~dlyis thought to be a signal that the F’ederaI
Resenve is going tn pursue an easier monetary policy
so the market reacts in anticipation of Federal Reserve
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open man’ket operations that will incn-ease the supply
ofcredit,~Consequently, then-e is an) immediate shift in
the supply of ct-edit, relative to demand, in anticipa-
tion of finn-then’ monetary ease, If the, announcenient
effect occur-s, it is overand above the dir’ect effect of a
discount rate change, and is illustr’ated by the shift
from S~to S. in figure 2?
Pullet: ..
Finally, then-e could he a ‘‘policy effect’’ if the l”ederal
Resenve actually changes its policy arid increases the
~This is not the onlypossible interpretation for the market, See Batten
and Thornton (1984) and Smith (1963) for a discussion of this point.
‘This also could have been illustratedby a reduction in the demand
for credit, but was illustrated as a shift in supply to keep the figure
simple,
growth rate of resenves. This also can be illustn-ated by
the shift l’rom 5,, to S. If the market con-n-ectly antici-
pates tire din-ection and rtiagnitude of tire policy effect,
man-ket inter’est rates will n-emain pen-manently lower at
R. Of course, this requires that the market’s expecta-
tions be correct, both in ten’ms ofthe actual change in
Feden-al Reserve policy and in ter’ms of the impact of
that policy change oil tire mar-ket.” As the l”eder-al
Reservepun-chases mon’e securities, spectiiator-s sell off
those acquin’ed in anticipation of the polin:y change. If
the market over-anticipates Federal Reserve actions,
however’, man-ket n-ales fir-st will fall below arid then
OThis briefdiscussion givesrise to severalissues nol analyzed in this
paper, such as the effectiveness of policy and the credibility of the
central bank, For a general discussion of the credibility issue, see
Cukierman (1986),
/
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subsequently n-ise to their long—rnnni eqnnilibr’ium. Fur-—
then-more, if the manket’s expectations ar-c’ incon-rect
and Federal Reserve policy n-emainis unchanged, inten-—
est nates will n-ise back to R, — the only impact of a
discount n-ate change would be the direct effect,
Soniie have an-gued that the policy effect has become
rnon’e important sinice the Octohen- 1982 change in) the
Feden’al Reserve’s open-ating procedure. At that time,
the tioard switched from a nonbon-nowed n-esen’e to a
born-owed n-eser\’e open-ating procedure. It is now
widely believed that the F’eden’al Reserve open-ates to
achieve a cen-tain average level of borrowed reserves
called the initial born-owing assinnnptioni over a given
time period: ‘the mechanics of this oper’ating pr-oce—
(lure can he illustnated by tracing the n-eaction of the
Feder-al Reserve to an unexpected incr’ease mi the
demand for n-esenves. Other things unchanged, an in—
cr-ease in the demand for’ n-eserves tends to cause both
honnowings anid the funds rate to r-ise, as depository
itistitutions attempt to satisfy their demand for it’—
senves in the money inan-ket and at the F’ederal Reserve
discount window. As borrowings incn’ease relative to
the borrowing assumption, the Fed incn-eases the snip—
‘ily of nonborrowed reserves via open man-ken pun’-
chases of goven-nment securities’, in response, both
hon-n-owing arid the feden-al funds rate fall.
A cut in the discount n-ate, not accompanied by a
change in the initial hon-n-owing assumption, works
analogmnslv. If the Federal Reserve cuts the discount
n’ate, the deriiand for’ hon-owed neseryes will iricn’ease
at all levels of the feden’al fnnnds nate, causing bon-n’ow—
ir’igs to in)(:1-ease n-dative to the initial bon’nowing as-
sumption. tf the initial bor’n’owing assnrniption is uni—
changed, the led mnrst increase the supply of
nonborn’owed reserves thn’ough open niiarket open’a—
tions until the federal funds n-ate has declined by
enough to retun-n hon-r-owirigs to the level of the hot’—
i-owing assumption).
‘the above implies that equation 1 can hewritten as:
(2) Borr* = a) H, — H,,).
where Borr* denotes the Feder-al Reserve’s initial hon’—
n-owrng assumption. Equation 2 imphes a constant
spr-ead betweeni the fedet-al hinds arid discoirnt n-ales,
‘For a discussion of this, see Roley (1986), Wallich (1984) and
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1986).
Figo’e 2




Any chanige mi the discount n-ate will he matched by an)
eqiral change in the feden-al hmnids nate, pn-oviding tliene
is no n:ompensatory chanige in the borrowing as—
sumption.
It should be emphasized that it is riot the discount
rate change per se that affects man-ken interest n-ates,
but the sutisequent policy effect if the Feden’ah Resenve
strictly adheres to an open-atinig pn’ocedun-e that at-
tempts to maintain the level of born’owinigs assumed
hiy its cun-r’ent policy directive. If the market perceives
this behavior, it could also stn-engthen any annoirnce—
ment effect
All of the potential effects of a change in the dis-
count n’ate on market in terest n-ates (but, in par-tic ulan,
the policy effecu depend on the so—called ‘‘liquidity
effect’’ — the change in) interest n’ates associated with
an unanticipated increase in the gm-owl Ii rate of the
riioney supply. While such an effect is widely touted in
theoretical discussions, there is little empirical evi-
dence to support it, Yet, without a liquidity effect or’ at
least the expectationi of a hiqnnidit~effect, changes in)
the discou nit rate could not have an inn pact on a bn’oad
spectrtnnni of market interest rates?
OThis, of course, ignores the possible effect of changes in expecta-
tions of inflation on interest rates, See Brown and Santoni (1983),
Cagan and Gandolti (1969) and Melvin (1983) for a review of the
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Much of the discussion thus fan has been can’nied
out in ten-ms of the federal funds n-ate, In reality, then’e
an-c a lan-ge number of differ-cnn n’ates: the n-ates on
feden-ai hinds, Tn-easuny bills, notes and bonds, com-
mercialbank loans, mon-tgages, etc. Ftence, the arn-ay of
cn-edit market assets should he divided into those that
ant’ closely n-elated to the discount n-ate and those that
ar-c less closely n-ehated to it,
The itiarket for federal funds is one segment of the
cr-odin man-ken that is pan’ticuhan-iv sensitive to discount
rate changes and to changes in Federal Reserve open’a—
tions, Feder-al funds are simply the n-esenve assets of
one depository institnrtion that ant’ sold (lentf to an—
other for the pun-pose of achieving tioth inistitutions’
desin’ed n-esenve positions. Because such funds are
close substitutes Ion- n-esenves supplied by the Feder’ah
Reserve, including those supplied tl’inougli the dis-
count window, changes in the discount n-ate on- Fed-
enal Reserve policy should initialiy affect the fedenal
funds rate and snnbsequently other- nian-ket i-ales. (See
page 10 for a discussion of the n’elationship between
the discount i-ate and the prime n-ate.)
.tkn’rmei,rute’ and lne• .Pate Npn/an
The n-elationship between the discount rate and
market inten-est n-ates rests, in one way or’ another-, on
the strength of the relationship between bon-rowings
and the i-atespi-ead. Equations land 2, however’, imply
that bon-rowings depend on more than the spread
between the market and discount r’ates. To see this,
assume that then-c are no impediments to bonTowing
so that depository institutions can hon-n-ow any
amount they desire at the discount window, If this
wen’e the case, borrowings would n-ise whetiever man—
ket nates were above the discount n-ate and fall when-
ever the discount n-ate is above the mar-ket nate. If we
ahstn-act from prohilerns of inflation and inflationary
expectations, the market n-at~ would always equal the
discount rate? But if H, = R~,however’, equation I
implies that bon-rowings wotnld be zen-o.
The data in chart 2, which show weekly adjustment
bon-n-owings and the federal firtids n-ate/discount n-ate
‘linder this arrangement, one can envision the Federal Reserve
pushing down interest rates byloweringthe discount rate, Asthis is
done, however, money growth will accelerate and so will inflation.
As a result, nominal interest rates will rise and money witl grow even
faster, Hence, even if the discountwindow were completely “open,”
the Federal Reserve would be unable to control interest rates with
the discount rate in anything but the short run.
spread from Octoben’ 1982 to June 1986, indicate that
the discount arid feden-al funds nates an-c seldom
equal.” Mont’over, when the rates are equal, bor’now-
ings are not zen-o. This is prima facie evidence that
bon-owing is not explained solely by the interest i-ate
spread. Indeed, Feden’aI Reserve regulations, which set
fon’th the conditions under- which depositony institu-
tions may use the discount window, make it clear that
hon-rowing is a privilege and explicitly state that it is
inappr’opriate to borrow “to take advantage of a differ-
ential between the discount rate and the n-ate on
alternative sources ofhinds.”
A visual inspection of chart 2 shows that then-c is
usually a positive relationship between bon-n-owings
and the n-ate spread, that is, that incn’eases in borrow-
ingstend to be associated with increasesin the spread
and vice ven-sa. Thent’ are, however, some man-ked de-
pan-tures from this relationship. The most obvious of
these occur-it’d with the shan-p increase in borrowings
in May—June 1984 and November 1985. Both of these
events went’ accompanied by special circumstances,
The former is associated with heavy discount window
borrowings by Continental Bank of Illinois and the
latter’ with the langest single-day hon-n-owing fn-om the
Federal Reserve when the Bank of New Yon-k (BONY)
experienced a computer failure on November 21,
1985.” Even when these outliens are ignored, however-,
there art’ instances when borrowings and the spn-ead
move in opposite directions. Moreover-, there is con-
sider-able variation) in the relationship between the
average level ofbonrowings and the aver-age levelofthe
spread. The most obvious of these is the period fronn
June 13, 1984, thn-ough October 3, 1984, when the
spn’ead averaged over 200 basis points and bon’ntwings
aver-aged less than a billion dollars, as compan-ed to an
avenage spn-ead of 70 basis points arid avon-age bonnow-
ings of $.7 billion oven’ tIre enitine period.’’
The strength of the n-elationshiip between bon-n-ow—
“Borrowing from the Federal Reserve is divided intothree categories:
adjustment borrowing, seasonal borrowing and extended credit
borrowing. The borrowing assumption, however, pertains only to
adlustment and seasonal borrowings; see Partian, Hamdani and
Camilli (1986).
“This is called the “reluctance of banks to borrow from the Federal
Reserve,” and at one time there was considerable discussion over
whether this reluctance was “inherent” or “induced.”
“See Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1986) for a discussion of
theBONY borrowings.
“It could be that depository institutions became more reluctant to
borrow from the Federal Reserve in light of the large borrowings by
Continental Bank.and the Prime Rate
The table above shows that oti four’ occasions
since October 1982 discoutit n-ate and pn-ime n-ate
changes went’ effective on the same day. In each
instance, the annotincement of a cut in the prime
n’ate followed the announcement of the discount
n-ate change. For the nt’maining five changes in the
discount rate, changes in the prime rate followed
discount rate chang s by a weck on more Also
there were a number- of changes in the prime n-ate
that wcnc not even remotely assocnatcd with
changes in the discount natc It would appear that
changes in market inten est n ates an e pnmarmly ne-




October 12,1982 10% to 9.5%
The Discount Rate
One possible r-eason for’ the hypothesized stn-ong
effects ofdiscount n-ate changes on inten-est rates is
the fact that discount n-ate changes and changes in
the commen-cial bank pn’inie n-ate often occun’ to-
gether and ant’ usually accompanied by a gn-eat deal
of publicity. Both of these n-ates an-c administer-ed
rates that do riot change daily with nian-ket l’orces,
but change less frequently and by fain-hv lan-ge
amounts.
pn-ime n-ate. If the Federal Reserve ctits the discount
n-ate flr’st, banks may feel additional pressunt’ to cut
their’ prime nate, hut this does riot imply that the
fon-mer caused the latter’. Rather hoth n-ates are
men-ely n-esponiding to man-ket forces.
Because changes mi the pr’ime r’ate often follow
on the heels ofchanges in the discoinnt rate, it nnay
lead some to conclude incorn-ectly the latter caused
the former. Because both are administer-ed n-ates,
howcvcn they ire likely torespond similarly but not
pn cisely coterminously to man kct rates For cxani
pie as market interest rates fall nd tttvc to th sc
tdmtntstencd nates, these mates become nncn as
nngly out of line with the maiket Hence thert’ rs an
nn( entive Ion the Fcdctal Rcscnc to (tnt the drs-
count nate and ton wmmcncral banks to cut thcu
Prime rate
Date effective Change
October 7, 1982 13.5%to 13%
October 13,1982 13% to 12%





February 25, 1983 11% to 10.5%
August8, 1983 l0.5%foll%
Marchl9,1984 11%toll.5%
April 5,1984 11.5% to 12%
Apnl 9 1984 8 5% to 9%
May 8, 1984 12% to 12.5%
June 25, 1984 12.5%tol3%
September 27, 1984 13% to 12.75%
October16 1984 1275%fol2S%
October29, 1984 12.5% to 12%
November 8, 1984 12% to 11.75%
November21, 1984 9% to 8.5%
November28, 1984 11.75%to 11.25%
December 19,1984 11.25%to 10.75%
December 24, 1984 8.5% to 8%
January 15,1985 10.75%to 10.5%
May 20, 1985 10.5% to 10% May 20, 1985 8% to 7.5%
June 18, 1985 10%to9.5%
March 7, 1986 9.5% to 9% March 7, 1986 7.5%to 7%
April 21, 1986 9% to 8.5% April 21, 1986 7% to 6.5%Chart 2
Adjustment plus Seasonal Borrowings from Federal Reserve








ings and tIne spn’ead can be estimated statistically by
considering the equation:
(3) Bon, = a, + a,{R,—H,,) + u,.
The ten-ni in, is a random distun-hance that can he
thought of as capturing the effect of ahh factors other
than the n-ate spn-ead that deten’mine deviations in
hon-n-owing fn-om its aver-age level. I”n’om a statistical
point of view, the van-iation in hon-r’owings can be de-
composed into two soun-ces: the pn-opon’tion exphanned
liy the i-ate spn-ead and that explained by all other’
factor-s. (Since the factor-s that go into u, an’e riot exphic—
ilhy identihed, this is called ‘‘unexplained van-iation.’’)
Eqination 3 is estimated witIi on’dinary least sqtnares,
using the weektv data shown mi chant 2. The outliers
for the weeks ending May 16 to June 6, 1984 and
November 27, 1985, wen’e deleted.” ‘the n-esults are
‘If these outliers are not removed, the R’ falls to about .15.
pn-esented in the fin-st n-o~’of table 1. The coefficient of
deten-mination, denoted ii’, measures the pn-opon-tion
of the van-iation in hon-n-owings explained by the n-ate
spn-ead, arid i—k’ is the pn’opontiuni of van-iation ex-
plained by all other- facton-s. The k’ itidicates that only
35 pen-cent of the var-iationi in hon-r-owings is accounted
for by the spn-ead, leaving 65 pen’cent to Iieacco unned
fon- by othen’ facton’s,
The fit cani be impn-oved by putting in a dunnnny
van’iabhe that takes on thevalue uric for’the period fr-onn
the week ending june 13, 1984, to October- 3, 1984,
when the spread was on usually high, and zen’o else—
when-c, The results of includinig a chinniniy vaniablcare
shown in the second row of table 1. Wbiihe including
Ihe dumnnny van-bible boosts the B’ sonnewhat , it does
non explain this atmniahv, N even-Iheless. even after ac—
connniting for this apparent shift in theborrowing funic—
tion. the spn’ead and the din mmnv variable explain only
Weekly Ayerooen of Daily Rates
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Estimates of Equation 3













*bndicates the variable is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level.
40 pen-cenit of the total variation iii bon’n-owings, leaving
the bi.nlk of the variation to be explained by other’
factor’s.”
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Sepan-atingthe thin-ce possible effects of discount n-ate
changes (in market interest n-ates — the direct, polic
and anniouncemenit effects — is dnfflcn.nlt, ‘l’he n-esuhts
in table 1, however’, provide a basis fon- estimating the
likely din-ect effect ofa discount n-ate change on inten-est
nates. From tire second n’ow of tabhe 1, we see that a 1
pen-centage—point 1100 basis—point) declme in the dis—
count rate will cause borrowings to increase by 8.419
hihhion. All nilhen things the same, thus wihh mci-case the
monetary base (in thie ion-ni of hom’n-owed n-esen’esl by
the same amount. Given an Mi—monetary base multi-
plier of2.7, this will produce a $1.13 billion increase irn
Ml 0 Such changes inthe niioney stock shift the supply
of credit no the nigbit, causing nian-ket interest rates to
fall. The effect of this on man-ket rates depends on the
“Because borrowings fluctuate with market interest rates, they can
be a source ofcyclical variation in the money stock. Because ofthis,
some have suggested that the discount rate be tied to some market
interest mate, Opponents of this view have argued that no single
interest rateadequately represents the appropriate opportunitycost
tor all institutions. 1 this were true, rates otherthan the federalfunds
rate might explain borrowings. Totestthis, the second equation on
table 1 was reestimated with the difference between the three-
month Treasury bill and federal funds rates added as a separate
regressor. The coefficient on the difference between these rates
was not statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent
level (t-ratio 1.26). Hence, it appearsthat the federalfunds rate is
the primary interest rate on which borrowing depends.
“The Ml multiplier averaged much less than this during all of the
period under consideration, i.e., 2.7 is approximately its current
level,
extent of the shift in the supply of credit and the
inten-est sensitivity of the demand fon credit, so it is
possible, in pn-inciple, to deten-mine the effect of an
exogenous chiange in the money stock on inten’est
rates.
The largest estimates of this liquidity effect conic
fi-oni esti nnated shor-t—rinn money demand equations.
F’or example, usual estimates singgest that a $1.13
billion change iii MI would pn-oduce a 67 basis—point
initial clianige in the thn-ee—nionth ‘l’n’easuny hill nate,
but only a six basis—point effect in thie hong—n-un equihib—
n-itim n’ate.’’ It is well known, howeven-, that such equa—
tions have unn-easonably large estimates of the liquid-
ity effect.” Other- stirdies, which attempt to estimate
the liquidity effect directly, show only sm-all and tn-an—
sient effects of unanticipated changes in mniney on
interest rates, Using these estimates, a $1.13 billion
change in the nioney stock would pn’oduce about a
one basis—point change in the ‘1—hill rate initially, with
no hong-n’uni effect whatsoeven’.”
P01 into another pen-spective, sinice Octoliem 1982 the
average,absolute weekly change in Mi has been $1.77
billion, more than uric and one—half times the esti—
nnated $1.13 billion change in Mi assriciated with a hnll
1 percentage—point change in the discoinnt rate. ‘l’hus,
the direct efl’ect of a change in the discount n’ate on
man-ket inten’est n-ales, alh othien lhiinigs constant, islikely
to be small.
~imieai F~. )Vaatialin.k,ai Cha.aqea in
the iJise;.~rnr:it tiate.
Alternatively, estimates of the ninagriitirde of the di—
nect effect can be ohitained by classifying discount nate
changes accon-ding to the neason they wen’e made.
Some discount n-ate changes an-c made solely as techni-
cal adjustments, designed to align the discount n’ate
with nian-ket initen-est r-ates, Othiers ant’ made for’ policy—
related reasons. These are called nontechnical
changes.
“These estimates are based on current levels of Ml and interest
rates, Using a short-run interest elasticity estimate from the
‘nominal-adjustment” specification of the short-run demand for
money ot --.015 and a money stock of $670 billion, the percentage
change in the interest ratewould be about 11 percent. A T-bill rate of
6 percent translates into a6 7basis-point change in market interest
rates, The long-run effect was calculated under the assumption of a
long-run elasticity of about — .14 ( ---.015/.11). These estimates are
in line with the results from Thornton (1985).
“See Carr and Darby (1981).
“See Brown and Santoni (1983). Similar estimates would be ob-
tainedfrom Cagan and Gandolti (1969) and Melvin (1983).1313
Since the r-esponse of bonnowings to a discounit rate
change shornhd h-ic the same regardless of the reason
fon’ the change, ceteris paribus, the din-ed effect of a
discount n-ate chiange on man-ken interest n’ates shiould
be thie same for- ahl changes mi the discount r’ate.’°
F’urthermon’e, there should be no change in the nnan—
ket’s pen-ception of policy when discount n-ate changes
are prnn-ehy Iechinical adjustnnents. For nontechnical
changes, however, not only is then-c a direct effect (line
to the impact on borrowings and the supply of cn-edit,
but a liotenitial announcement effect, which may or
may not be validated by subseqinent Feden-al Resenve
actions. If the discount i-ate changes that at-c made
pun-ely as technical adjustments do not affect market
interest n-ates, this is funthen’ evidence that then-c is
essentially no direct effect of discount n’ate changes.
Any inten-est n-ate effects come thi-ough an announce—
ment effect or subsequent policy changes.
It should be noted that the fact that the Federal
Reserve changes the discount n-ate from time to time
solely to bring it in line with market interest rates is
itself prima j’ircie evidence that the link tietween hion-
nowings and the feden-ah funds/discount nate sjjn-ead is
not the sole determinant of depositony institutioni
bonTowing. Ifit were, the FedenahResenve shiould never
have to make such technical adjustments, hint this is
not tire case. Of the nine discount rate changes fnonii
October’ 1982 to June 1986 listed in table 2, three wet-c
stated to have hieen made solely for technical reasons
and nhn-ee of the n-emaining six mentioned technical
concerns as one of the reasons fon’ the change.”
Recent empirical won-k pn-ovides stn-onig evidence
that only discount n-ate changes made for’ policy rea-
sons affect market inten’est n-ates.’’’Fhis won-k is up-
dated her’e by estimating tine eqination:
10
(4) Ahl~= ci,, + ~ a4R,, + [3ADR, + u,,
i= 1
“This discussion assumes that the Federal Reserve is not trying to
control the money stock, and in particular, it is not using a monetary
base or total reserves target. If it were, any change in the discount
ratewould have no direct effect on interest rates because the effect
of such a change would be neutralized by compensatory open
marketoperations.
“The classification used is based upon the Federal Reserve’s an-
nounced statement of intentions as used by Thornton (1982) and
Batten and Thornton (1984, 1985). Smirlock and Yawitz (1985)
investigate alternative schemes, but find that the one employed
here works best. Their results are supported by Hakkio and Pearce
(1986).
“See Thornton (1982), Batten and Thornton (1984, 1985), Smirlock
and Yawitz (1985) and Hakkio and Pearce (1986).
whene AR denotes the one-day change in a man-ken
interest rate, and AUR denotes the change in the
discount rate,” This equation was estinnated rising
daily data from Octoben 1, 1982, to June 11, 1986, using
both the federal firnds and three—month ‘l’neasuny bill
n-ates.’l’he T—hiill n-ate was selected to nepnesenl man-ket
interest n’ates in genen-al. Estimates ofthe coefficient on
AIJR and some summary statistics an’e pn-esented in
table 3.”’I’hie results indicate that a change in the
discount n-ate has a positit’e, significant effect on tioth
the federal funds arid T-bihh rates on tire next man-ket
day. The eft’ect on the feden-al funds n-ate is roughly 2.5
times that on the ‘I—bill n-ate.
When the discount n-ate (:hanges an-c pan-titioned
into those made for- technical n’easons fADRT( and
those made for- nontechnical reasons IADRNTI, the
resuhts indicate that discount n’ate changes made
solehy for’ technical n-easons had no significant effect
on the federal funds rate.Tlie n’esults for’ the T-liill rate
an-c less clean’, ‘l’he coefficient on discount n-ate chianges
made solely for- technical neasons is smaller- than thiat
for policy—n-elated reasons, tiut is statistically signifi-
cant at tire 5 pen-cent level. A closen- hook, boweven-,
reveals that onky one of the thn’ee discount n-ate
changes made snihely for technical n’easons is associ-
ated with movement inn the T—hill n’ate in the expected
din-ection, The half—per-cent decline mi thie discount
n-ate on October 12, 1982, is associated with a 37 basis—
point decline in the ‘h—bill n-ate. In conitn’ast, the half—
percent incn’ease (inApnih 9, 1984, is associated with a9
hasis—poinit decline in the ‘F—hill nate and the hiahf—
pen’cent decrease on Apn-il 21, 1986. is associated with
no change in the ‘f—hill nate.
Wheni discount n-ate changes made fon’ purely tech—
nical n’easuns are pan’tit ioned into the onie made on
October 12, 1982 (AURTO, and the (itlier tvvo (ADftl’i,
the n-esuhts inidicate that signilicance of technical
changes on the three—month Tr-easuny bill n-ate is due
to the chiange on Octoben’ 12. Fun-then-mon-c, the effect
on tIne federal funids nate is signilicanit at ihe 10 lien—
“aDR takes on the value of the discount rate change on the day that
the changebecame effective, The one exception isthe change that
was announced on November 21, 1984. effective immediately.
Since the announcement was made at 4:15 p.m. EST after the
market closed, the 2DR takes on a value on November 23. (The
federal funds rate declined by 35 basis points between November
21 and 23 and increased by 4 basis points between November 20
and 21).
‘4The coefficients on the distributed tag of the dependent variable are
notreported because they are intended only to capture theeffect of
all previously known information on these interest rates and are not
of importancethemselves.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1986 4
Table2
Discount Rate Changes, October 1982 to June 1986
Date effective Change Classification Reason
October 12, 1982 10% to 9.5% T Action taken to bring the discount rate into closer alignment with short-
term marketinterest rates
November22, 1982 9.5% to 9% P Action taken against the background ofcontinued progress toward greater
price stability and indications of continued sluggishness in business
activity and relativelystrong demand forliquidity
December14, 1982 9% to 8.5% P Action taken in light of current business conditions, strong competitive
pressures on prices and further moderation of cost increases, a slowing of
prnvate credit demands and present indications of some tapering off in
growth ofthe broader monetary aggregates
April 9, 1984 8.5%to 9% T Actnon taken to bring discount rate intocloser alignment with short-term
interest rates
November21, 1984 9% to 8.5% P Action taken in vnewofslow growth ofMl and M2 and the moderate pace
of business expansion, relatively stable prices and a continued strong
dollar internationally
December24, 1984 8 5% to 8% P Essentially the same as before plus to brnng the dnscount rate nnto more
appropriate alngnment with short-term market interest rates
May 20 1985 8% to 75% P Action taken in the light of relatively unchanged output in the industry
sector stemming from rising nmports and a strong dollar. Rate reduction ns
consistent with declining trend in market interest rates
March 7. 1986 7 5% to7% P Action taken in context of similar action by other important industrial
countries and for closer alignment with market interest rates. A further
consideration was a sharp decline in oil prices
April 21, 1986 7% to 6.5/0 T Action taken to bring discount rate into closer alignment with prevailing
levels of market rates
P policy related
T = technical
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, paraphrased from statements in various issues, and the Wall Street JournaL
cent level when these data are pai-titioued inn tlus way. ~‘ious finding that there is little, if any, direct effecn of a
This is the onily inistanice when a technical n:hange in di scouni I rate change on nnnai-ket in terest rates,
the discount rate had a significant effect on man-ken It could lie, Iiovveven’, that discount rate chianges
i ntn s I bu pr t~ 0tith t inn i (ii ( % td( n( suggn sts th it
ni nd( soln h~ton li ~hun( tl n-n isons in ( iiiont ix ndnls hts ount atc h tnig~ s iii ndc sol( h liii ti ( ho It il in i
ante.ip fir d tin in thosi mu nd( Ion polity n tsons sons have no statistically signinincant dec t on nnan’ke t -. . -
this i~u thu ( ns( mid ii tli ni ink( t p( nn ( nit. d tint.
nnt( test i ites thins n I suIt is n ninsnst( nit yr ith our jin
effect of the correspondn rig change in thie money sup-
ply on interest rates, uiar-ket n-ates would chanige lM’iot
to the change in the discount rate so there wniuld he
“Thischange was announcedtwodaysafterthe Federal Reservede- no statistically si ‘nifin:annt (rfiect followina the an—
emphasized Ml as a monetary target. (See Thornton (1983) ton a -, r, -
discussion ofthis period.) While therewas no immediateannounce- nounicemenit of a discoinnt rate change. llakkmo arid
ment of the decision to de-emphasnze Ml, therewere leaks to this Pearce (19861 n’epon’t that discount nate n:lianges made
effect, so the market may have interpreted the October12 decrease - I--I-’ I ----- ‘‘‘-‘ Ii ‘ f - ‘c’isted
in the discount rateas an indication that the Federat Reservewould ~ Cr. mud I n.asoiis am ii. no nnon . n (.~t(I) 01(,.~.
move toward an easier policy. There were teaks to the press on than those ruade tornontechnical r-easons. Hence. this
October 7 that the Federal Reserve would pay more attention to
interest rates and less to Ml growth. See BNA’s Daily Report for
Executives, October 8, 1982. market, and by Batten and Thornton (1984, 1985) and F-lakkio and
Pearce (1986) for the foreign exchange market.
“This finding hasbeen reiterated by Thornton (1982), Smirtock and
Yawitz (1985) and the results presented in table 5 for the money “This coniecture is offered by Batten and Thornton (1984).Another’ way of estimating the direct effect of a
discount n-ate change on market inten-est nates comes
from noting that deposinon’ institutions have little
incentive to hon-i-ow from the Pc-den-al Reserve wheti
the discount rate is a penalty n-ate,’’ that is, when it is
ahoye thie fedem-al hinds rate. Depository institutions
that horn-ow from the Feden-ah Reserve wheni the dis-
count rate is a penalty n-ate are assumed to do so fon’
reasons other than to minimize the exhilicit cost of
(ihtaining n-eserve idjustinent fluids, Changes iii the
discount rate that come when the discount rate is a
penalty n-ate ~— especially changes that leave the dis-
count i-ate at penalty levels — shiould have no effect on
horn-owing and, hence, no dinect effect on man-ken in-
terest rates.” If estimates indicate that discount rate.
hanges mmdc whcn ttu dis (Mint rate is not n Pmn
rite do not hi nyc ann tIn t (Mi in ni ket n afts ~4nhc thosc
in idc whcn thu drs ount r itt ts a pcnahty n at( do hav
i signifit ant ffect this would lit kin then evndenu e th it
there is no direct effect of a discounit rate change on
market intet’est nates.
To test this hypothesis, discount rate changes were
partitioned into those when the discount rate was a
penal tv n-ate (zXDRPI prior’ to tine anmnornncernent and
those when the discount n-ate was not a penalty i-ate
(~DRNP) Y’ ‘lime results, n-epon-ted in talihe 4, indicate
that changes made wheni the discount i-ale was a
penalty n-ate ar-e statistically significant.’ Furlher-mnoi-e,
“Thepartition used was based upon whether the discount ratewas a
penalty rate with respect to the federal funds rate, There was only
one instance when the discount rate was a penalty with respect to
theT-bitl rate, Such a partition is oflittle interest, however, since the
evidence in footnote IS indicates that the federal funds rate is the
relevant opportunitycost variable,
‘Sellon and Seibert (1982) pertormed a similar analysis on data for
the period from February 1980 to August 1982 and found that
discount nate changes made when the discount rate was a penalty
rate had no statistically significant effect on market interest rates or
borrowings. During this period, however, such discount rate
changes were primarily those made for technical reasons; thus it
appears that the Sellon and Seibert result is due to this fact and not
to the factthat the discount rate was at a penalty levelat the time of
thechange. See Thornton (1982) for the technical vs. nontechnical
results over a similar period.
Table 3
Estimates of Equation 4 for Technical and Nontechnical
Discount Rate Changes













































*lndicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
alter-native inten-pretation appean’s to have little merit.”
“Their“forecasts,” however, are basedon in-sample results and are
not true ex ante forecasts.
“While this idea iscommonin the literature, e.g., Broaddus and Cook
(1983) and Setton and Seibert (1982). it is sometimes presented in
such a way that itappearsthat theonly effect is the direct effect, In
this case, anyfinding of a significant effect of a discount ratechange
on market interest rates implies that it is produced via the direct
effect, We have shown, however, this is not the case.changes made when the discount i-ate was riot a
penalty n-ate were not statistically significant. These
results are pi-ecisely theopposite of those that should
have heen obtained if the effect of a discount nate
change, reported in table 3, were due to a dii-ect effect.
The evidence indicates that discount rate changes
do non directly affect nmarket interest rates. Conse-
quently, the effect on market rates itidicated in table 3
must be mimic toan announcement effect, a policy effect
or both. Because the effect measured in table 3 occur’s
on the dayfollowing the announcement of a change in
the discount rate and changes made for technical
reasons have no effect on market n’ates, this str’ongly
suggests that it is, at least in par-t, an announcenietit
effect. tt is impossible to determine, however’, whether-
the expectations were stibsequently validated by
changes in the n-ate at which tIme Feder-al Reserve
supplied reserves.3’
Attempts made to test directly for a policy response
following a discount rate change were inconchusive~’
Nevertheless, some evidence bean-s on the policy ef-
fect, at least in teimsof its implications for’ the per-iod
following the Octohen 1982 change in the Federal
Resenve’s operating procedure. First, if the F’ed’s new
operating pn-ocedune attempts to maintain a constant
spread between the feclenal hinds and discount n-ate,
bor-n-owings always should he close to their- assumed
level. Chant 3 plots the actual level of adjustment plus
seasonal born-owings and their assumed level for
weekly data from October 6, 1982, through December
1985. As the chart shows, the actual level of hon-rowing
often (leviates fnom Ihe initial lion-rowing assuniiption,
“Alternatively,Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) allowfor the change in the
discount rate to impact marketinterest rates with a lag of up tofive
days. Because they cannot reject the hypothesis that effects past
the initial dayare significant, they conclude that the rapid adjustment
is consistent with market efficiency. Because the market rates
nearly always return to levels prior to discount rate changes, how-
ever, it is possible tofind no statistically significant long-run effect
simply by making the rag “tong enough” or a permanent effect (as
they found) by making it “short enough.”
“Several attempts to directly test various hypotheses were con-
ducted, but the results were unsatisfactory. For example, discount
rate changes that indicate a change in policy — regardless of the
reason given for the change — should be followed by a sharp
change in the growth of nonborrowed reserves. Hence, statistical
tests of nonborrowed reserve growth before and after discount rate
changes were undertaken, Because the nonborrowed reserve data
only are available biweekly, the tests were also done using weekly
Ml data, The results indicated no statistically significant change in
the growth rate of either nonborrowed reserves or Ml; however, the
data were highly variable and the observations few, Hence, these
tests should be considered inconclusive.
Table 4
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lnciraiess’ai;siica siqrificanco at the 5 p’-~ c-nt love
sometimes by a considen’abhe magnitude. Two of the
niost notable deviations, of cour’se, occurn-ed in nud-
1984 and Novembeu’ 1985. Even when these unusual
periods are ignon-ed, the average absolute deviation of
borrowings from the initial horroiving assumption is
$226 nnllion, oven- 40 percent ofthe aver-age level ofthe
initial borrowing assuniption during the period.
Furthen’mon’e, there is a tendency for-the initial bor—
i-owing assumption to fillow, -ather than lead,
changes in actual lion-rowings. It appears that the
federal funds/discount i-ate spread is maintained
when the lion-i-owing assumption changes; the de-
matid for borrowed n-eser’ves is not forced to conform
to the bon-r-owing assumption.
Second, ifthe policy effect isstrong, time r-esponse of
man-ken intenest rates, especially the feden-al hinds n-ate,
to a change in thediscount rate should lie larger since
the Octoben- 1982 change in the open-ating pn-ocedure.
To test this, equation 4 was i-eestimated fon- the peniod
from October 1, 1979, to June 11, 1986, and the n-c--
spouse of mar-km interest rates to nontechnical
changes in the discount n-ate was allowed to lie diffen--
cnn for the periods October 1, 1979, to October 5, 1982,
and October 6, 1982, to June 11, 1986. The results are
reported iii table 5 with the coefficients fon the pie-
and post-October 1982 periods denmoted by
ADRNTPRE82 and aDRNTPOSTS2, respectively.’
“Because of the differences in the variation of the dependent vari-
ables between the periods, the equation was estimated adjusting for
heteroskedasticity. Also, the pre-October 1982 period includes a
surcharge variable because Thornton (1982) has shown the results
are sensitive to this modification, While not reported here, the
surcharge coefficient is nearlyidentical to that reported byThornton.
The coefficient on WRNTPRE82 differs from that reported by
Thornton primarily because of a difference in the sample period;
however, all of the qualitative conclusions are the same.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF Sf, LOUiS AUOUST~SEFTEMBER1966
chart 3
Adjustment plus Seasonal Borrowings from Federal Reserve
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The results simow that the responsiveness of the
federal hinds rate to changes in time mhscount rate was
essentially the same during the two periods. Indeed,
an F-test of the equality of the two coefficients does
not 1-eject the hypothesis that the responmse was the
same. There is a statistically significant difference in
the responsiveness of the ‘F—bill i-ate; however~it has
become less, not more, responsive to changes in the
discount rate. ‘the evidence suggests that the shift iii
the Feds operating procedure has not increased the
initial response of market interest rates to discount
rate cimanges; if anmytimitmg it appear-s to hmave lowered it,
Finally, then-c is oime additional piece of evidenmce on
the anmnouncenient vs. pohi~effect of a discount rate
clmange. ‘l’he effect of the discount rate 0mm market
interest rates, especially time policy effect, implies cau-
sality runmning from time feden-al funds n-ate to otimer
market inter-est rates. in on-der to investigate this, tests
of Gr-anger causality” were conducted usinmg both
daily and weekly data for- the federal funds and three-
nmonth‘l’r-easuny bill u-ates, These tests are designed to
determine wlmetheu- cimanges in one n-ate precede or
follow chmamiges in time othen’. (Details and re.sults are
presented in time appendix.) Time results using the daily
data indicate that cimanmges in the ‘l’—bill rate precede
chmanges in time fedeu-ai funds, the reverse of what the
policy—etiect hypothesis would most strongly imply.
The n’esults using weekly (lana am-c less deFinitive, mdi—
catinmg that at times eithem rate precedes time other.
While this result is not particulai-iysurprising, the fact
that thestronger-(most statistically significant) effect is
fn’om time T—biil n-ate to the federal funds rate is incon—
sistent with a strong policy effect.
While these results are disquieting to timose who
suppon-t time policy effect, they an-c not conclusive. Time
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Table 5
Estimates of Equation 4 with the Discount Rate Partitioned into the Pre- and
Post-October 1982 Periods
Dependent
Variable Constant .XDRT iORNTPREB2 \DRNTPOST82 F-Test’ A’ SE
rederar funds rare .006 382 .824’ .779 013 .14 1.01
(0.54) (1 39,1 12.851 12.71)
Treasury bill rate .001 .129 686’ .292’ 10.206’ 04 I 00
(02.3) (1.68) f6 57) {~-43r
‘Inducates statist,cdl significance at the 5 percent level,
Test of the hypothesis that the cocftucionis on ~DRNTPRE82 and ~DRNTPOST82 are equal
icy effects depends on the interpretation of a discount
rate change. tfit is believed that discount rate changes
are primarily signals that the Fedeu-ah Reserve isgoing
to continue its present policy of ease or restraint, the
policy effect should be nil. If, on the other hand,
discount rate changes typically signal a change in the
rate at which the Federal Reserve is going to supply
reseuves to the system, the extent to which one be-
lieves this change will affect market interest rates
depends on one’s view of the liquidity effect. tf the
liquidity effect is believed to be weak and tr-ansient —
as most empiricalwork suggests — the response ofthe
market to such changes is essentially noise, with no
i-cal significance for the future course (or level) of
market interest rates. tn such instances, discount i-ate
cuts that ar-c followed by mon-c expansiommary mone-
tarypolicy ultimately might be followed by highenL not
lower-, interest rates if such a policy change gives rise
to expectations ofhigher-inflation. On the other- hand,
if one believes that the liquidity effect is strong and
lasting, changes in the discount rate will be timought to
have pernmanent effects on market inten-est rates, hut
only iffollowed by a change in Federal Reserve policy.
This article was intended to clari~’ the relationship
between the Federal Reserve’s discount rate and mnar-
ket interest rates. Three distirmct, though not mutually
exclusive, potential effects of a discount rate change
on market interest nates were outlined: (1) the ‘direct,
ceteris paribus, effect,’ which abstracts fi’onm market
reactions to the discount n-ate change and any suhise-
quent change in Feden-al Resenve operations; (2) the
“announcement effect,” which reflects the changing
expectations ofthe Federal Reserve’s activity based on
the announced change in the discount i-ate; and (3)
the ‘policy effect,” the impact of a subsequent change
in Federal Reserve activity on the market. Special at-
tention was given to the hypothesis that the impact of
discount i-ate changes on market interest rates be-
came stronger following the Federal Reserve’s switch
flom a nonborrowed reserve to a borrowed reserve
operating procedure in October 1982.
‘rhe evidence showed a statistically significant effect
of a change in the discount rate on both the fedenal
funds and Treasury bill rates immediately following
the discount rate chmange. A series of tests provided
evidence, consistent with the theory, that the direct
effect of a discount rate change is nil. Consequently,
the impact ofa discount rate changeon market rates is
due to an announcement effect, a policy effect on both.
The rapidity with which market rates respond to the
(liscountrate change suggests thatthe announcement
effect is operative. Furthermore, some indirect tests of
the policy effect produced results that ar-e inconsis-
tent with it, suggesting that discount rate changes
have had no per-manent effect on market interest rates.
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, — R,.,,, and R~ aumd R~ denote the federal funds and
three—monthTreasury bill rates, ntspectively.The pro—
frEts (fl tIiTiflf$f’I’ L/fiis//h&F cedure consists of testing the hypotlmesis that p,, =
= ‘‘‘= = 0. If this hypothesis is rejected, it is said
Tests of (zr-anger causality are really tests of tem-
- — - the causality n’tins fronm the federal funds u’ate (Ru.) to
pont! ordenng of time series, the test of causality the three—umiotmth Er-easury bill i-ate (B.,.). To test for
running lm’onm the federal funds rate to the I reasury -
- ‘ causality running fu’om the Freasuny 1)111 nate to tIme
bull rate us performed by estimating, using ordinary —
- federal funds rate, the equation least squan’es OLS, thme equation
An1, = ~, +flARn ~ AR,, = ~0 + ~~
Table A.1
Granger Causality Results for 1XR, and .XRT: Daily Data
Testsof i’s = 0
Lags ofAR,
Lags of
.SR 1 23456 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 .342 .355 .358 382 3/? 378 346 346 .338 342 .342 341
2 674 610 .616 646 646 64/ .583 585 5/5 586 SB? 585
3 .570 .524 481 519 526 527 486 497 498 512 .513 512
4 6/8 64/ .617 677 681 687 .651 662 .660 6/5 675 .675
5 775 .739 .707 741 715 716 .672 685 .663 675 .6/6 675
6 .707 682 666 713 709 704 695 704 694 .656 .686 .684
7 .118 706 696 751 /54 746 650 653 .634 645 64 .639
B 494 .480 .457 492 .473 4/i 467 436 .439 .428 .429 .423
g ,3j9 .325 305 311 .291 792 31? .284 246 .218 218 219
10 .267 .242 223 223 .197 198 250 216 .171 .185 1B4 .186
1 238 .227 .217 220 .198 199 237 213 178 i75 1/2 1/2
12 211 .208 205 218 .199 200 217 199 1/6 168 .159 .i63
Tests of i~s= 0
- Lags of
Lags of
ART 1 234567891 0 ~11 12
1 681 379 304 195 173 107 102 098 059 061 057 060
2 .837 .581 .419 .249 .167 .037 .054 -050~ .031* .032* .026* .026’
3 .597 .372 .469 .386 .300 .198 117 .106 -068 .070 .058 .055
4 .640 .409 .462 .540 453 .310 166 .147 .084 .087 .071 .064
5 .524 .288 .302 .293 .437 .397 .256 235 .145 .149 .125 .114
6 £25 .382 .385 .360 474 .524 .338 .303 .174 .178 .146 .132
7 .673 .476 .450 466 .590 .639 .377 .315 .166 .168 .135 .116
8 £86 .526 .552 .540 .676 .733 .482 .408 .220 .222 .177 .152
9 .770 .620 .648 .641 .765 .809 .563 .477 .299 .301 .246 .213
10 .792 .634 .654 .659 .799 .835 .638 .560 .381 .382 .317 .276
11 .550 .714 .734 .740 .559 .878 707 .627 .435 .434 .381 .343
12 .787 £33 .649 .628 .745 .777 .658 .579 .424 .425 .384 .319
0lndicates significance at the 5 percent level.Table A
Grange
.2
r Causality Results for ~\R1 and ,XR,: Weekly Data
Tests of ru’s = 0
Lags of .\R,
Lags of
AR 1 23456789 10 11 12
1 .269 258 .242 .314 319 .312 .361 415 352 339 .341 434
2 538 505 493 ~80 570 .564 .615 673 .649 632 .635 .736
3 291 33/ 423 .466 4// .453 501 536 j6/ 482 485 .525
4 .325 374 .512 602 6~3 b84 617 648 677 60/ .606 632
5 .209 248 352 .501 535 .531 549 590 648 593 .596 544
6 025’ .031’ 053 .086 .086 .051 066 077 058 056 .05/ .058
7 028’ 034’ .0b6 084 065 056 092 108 085 085 .087 08/
8 .038’ .047’ 077 .113 112 086 108 131 117 116 118 .118
9 .061 .0/4 115 .162 161 130 .158 187 162 .164 .166 .161
10 074 .088 .136 169 170 14/ 185 216 225 225 228 221
11 .092 109 161 205 210 192 241 .275 293 .297 299 792
12 .oyg 11/ 170 215 209 207 .265 .294 346 .356 361 3/0
Tests of, s 0
Lags of AR,
Lags of
AR 234 56/89 10 11 12
.0/3 .031’ 022’ 039’ 041’ 03W 046’ 041’ 046’ .045’ 042’ 054
2 .181 097 0/0 115 ~23 115 134 123 137 136 128 15/
3 .043’ .029’ .008’ 021’ 024’ 020’ 024’ .029’ 080 .078 077 087
4 .021’ 016’ 005’ 015’ 016 015’ .017’ .022’ 069 .071 065 0/1
5 .045’ 024’ .00/’ 018’ 07’’ 015’ .017’ 022’ .063 .065 066 111
6 .040’ .022’ 009’ 02V 024’ 021’ 024’ .030’ 071 .073 06/ 167
7 045’ 02/’ 012’ 027’ 031’ .028’ .032 .044’ 103 107 103 .161
6 02?’ 01?’ 00/ 017’ 018’ 016’ .019’ 029’ 101 101 107 103
9 044’ 027’ .013’ 028’ 030’ 027’ 030’ 045’ .149 153 158 -‘38
10 062 036’ .014’ 030’ .033’ .030’ Q34’ 049’ .144 141 .157 .108
ii 044’ 028’ 013’ .026’ .027’ .025* 028’ .041* .115 .109 .110 .146
12 .063 .041* .020 .038’ .041’ .037’ .042’ .059 .150 .143 .146 .183
indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
is estummated and the hypothesis that c, = 8, = ..‘ = c~ corresponding to the F—statistics for all orders ar-c
= 0 is tested. if time imypothesis is rejected, the causal— preseumted in tables A.1 and AZ for time daily and
ity runs from the Treasurybill rate to the federal funds weekly dat a, respectively.
rate. if the hypotheses concerumiimg the Ii’s and time c’s ,. .. . -
- I lie tests using daily data simow unmidirectional c-au-
inc both reji c tc d thc r is s ud to b brdtri Lion II
salitv trom RT to B~, Lime opposite ofwhat isrequired for iusahty between thi r ate-~It umc rther is rcjt c ft d timi
policy actions tohe traimsnmitted from the leden-al funds sc nes arc s ird to he mdc pc ndcimt
rate to otimer immarket interest rates. It should he noted
l’lme tests were performed using botim daily anti that the daily federal funds rate series exhibits consid—
weekly d mta Rut iusc (hi. II st n-c suits tic quntc Sc nsr en ibiy mor c yin ibiintv tim tim (lit I bill i itt. St iii s VV1m( im
tivu to timu or dci of tint I ig K thu Lusts ~vc r pi don inc ci thc sc cut t ut. snnoothcd by ivur iging0’ Ci a ‘vt ( k th
on all orders up to K = 12. ‘lime significance levels tests indicate bidirectional causality; however-, the
strongerrelationship appears to be runnming fi-onn the
‘For a discussion of this procedure, see Thornton and Batten (1985). ‘1-bill i-ate to time fedenai furnds i-ate.